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RECENT CASES
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST: EXPOSING THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHICAGO'S
STRIP SEARCH POLICY-MARY BETH G. V.
CITY OF CHICAGO
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons
against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The United States Supreme
Court has held that a search without a warrant is an unreasonable search
in violation of the fourth amendment. 2 Certain judicially created exceptions
to the warrant requirement, however, have evolved over the years.3 One
exception, search incident to arrest, allows a police officer to conduct a
warrantless search of an arrestee's person incident to an arrest." The
permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest is a question that has
troubled the United States Supreme Court for many years. Although the
Supreme Court has considered the permissible scope of a search incident to an
arrest in several opinions,' it has failed to establish clear parameters to guide police
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
The Supreme Court applied the fourth amendment to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Wolf court, however, did not require
the states to employ the exclusionary rule for violations of the fourth amendment. Twelve years
later, in Mapp v. Ohio, 338 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court reversed itself and extended
the exclusionary rule to the states. For a complete analysis of the fourth amendment as it
relates to search and seizure, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REv. 349 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (a search of private property nor-
mally must be pursuant to a search warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (searches
conducted without a warrant are unreasonable).
3. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) (open fields); South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973) (border search); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (plain view search), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874
(1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit);
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (abandonment), reh'g denied, 362 U.S. 984 (1960); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile search). For a complete discussion of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, see J.W. HALL, JR., SEARCH
AND SEIZURE §§ 3:9, 3:18, 3:24, 4:1, 7:1, 8:1 (1982).
4. See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search of automobile indicent to
an arrest); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (search of arrestee's clothing incident
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conduct. As a result, arrested persons often have been subjected to highly
intrusive body searches by police officers.'
In recent years, it has become a common police department practice to
subject arrestees to such highly intrusive body searches.7 These searches are
called strip searches' and have been described as "demeaning, dehumanizing,
undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signi-
fying degradation and submission."' 9 The policies of many police depart-
ments require that all arrestees be strip searched, even those arrested for
misdemeanor and non-misdemeanor traffic offenses.'" Despite the highly
offensive and extremely questionable nature of such practices, the United
States Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of such a
blanket strip search policy." In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,'2 the
Seventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of the City of Chicago's strip
search policy. Chicago's policy provided that all females detained in a City
lockup be strip searched prior to detention regardless of the charges against
them. Further, strip searches were performed regardless of whether the
arresting officer or detention aide believed that the arrestee was concealing
contraband.' 3 The Seventh Circuit held that the City's policy violated the
fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches."'
The Mary Beth G. decision signifies the Seventh Circuit's retreat from
to an arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search of arrestee's person inci-
dent to arrest); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of arrestee's house incident
to an arrest).
6. Searching the arrestee is an evidentiary and protective practice. A search of the arrestee
may result in the discovery of weapons or evidence of crime. See Simons, Strip-Search, 6
BARRISTER 8 (Summer 1979).
7. Id.
8. The terms "strip search" and "body cavity search" have been subject to varying inter-
pretations. According to one commentator, a strip search requires an individual to disrobe.
A visual body cavity inspection requires the additional step of bending over, lifting the genitals,
and spreading the buttocks so that a visual inspection of these areas may be made. A body
cavity search involves the manual probing of an individual's rectum or vagina. See Note, Con-
stitutional Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1033 n.2 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Body Searches in Prisons].
Other commentators do not distinguish between a strip search and a visual body cavity
inspection. See Shuldiner, Visual Rape: A Look at the Dubious Legality of Strip Searches,
13 J. MAR. L. REV. 273, 274-75 (1980).
For purposes of this Recent Case, a strip search will be defined as having an arrested person
remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of
the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts, or undergarments of such person. This is the statutory
definition in Illinois. ILL. REv. STAT. 38, § 103-1(d) (1983).
9. Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491, aff'd, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Sala v. County of Suffolk (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (unpublished opinion)).
10. Strip search practices have surfaced in Chicago, St. Louis, Houston, Racine, and New
York. See Simons, supra note 6, at 8.
11. The Court has declined to review a lower court decision dealing with a blanket strip search
policy. Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982).
12. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
13. Id. at 1266.
14. Id. at 1273.
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prior United States Supreme Court cases which addressed the search inci-
dent to arrest exception." The Supreme Court has stated that once there
is a lawful custodial arrest, a search incident to that arrest requires no addi-
tional justification. 6 The Court has also stated that once the arrest has
established the authority to search, a "full search"' 7 of the person is a
reasonable search under the fourth amendment.'" An analysis of the impact
of Mary Beth G. on these Supreme Court decisions must be prefaced by
a discussion of the Supreme Court cases which have addressed the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amend-
ment. Accordingly, this Recent Case will review the development of the search
incident to arrest case law. The Mary Beth G. decision will then be analyzed
in light of that background.
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
The United States Supreme Court has determined that a search without
a warrant is an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amendment.' 9
The courts, however, have developed several exceptions to the warrant
requirement."0 Two exceptions, exigent circumstances and search incident to
arrest, were developed in response to a need to protect police officers and
to prevent the destruction of evidence. The exigent circumstances exception
allows a warrantless search when the particular circumstances surrounding
that search indicate that an immediate search is necessary. 2' Such a search
is permissible to protect the officer,22 to protect the public, 23 and to prevent
15. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
16. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). For a full discussion of the Robinson
decision, see LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127.
17. A full search incident to an arrest may involve a relatively extensive exploration of
one's person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968).
18. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (a search of private property nor-
mally must be pursuant to a search warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (searches
conducted without a warrant are usually unreasonable). To obtain a warrant, police officials
must first convince a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists. See, e.g., New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1980) ("It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
that the police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that
there is probable cause to do so."); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (the
warrant plays a significant role in fourth amendment protection). For a general discussion of
the warrant requirement, see J.W. HALL, JR., supra note 3, at §§ 6:1-18; W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE §§ 4.1-.13 (1978).
20. See supra note 3.
21. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). For a general discussion
of this doctrine, see Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 419 (1973).
22. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police officer allowed to stop and frisk for weapons
in order to protect himself); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (officer can make a
self-protective search for weapons).
23. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless entry to capture a fleeing felon
necessary to protect public).
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the destruction of evidence."
Likewise, the search incident to arrest exception is justified by the need
to protect the officer who is carrying out official duties and to prevent the
destruction of evidence.2" The exigent circumstances exception and the search
incident to arrest exception are similar in that each permits police to dispense
with the warrant requirement due to an overriding necessity. Although our
fourth amendment rights are jealously guarded,' the exceptions to the warrant
requirement are justified in situations where the public's interest in having
the search immediately conducted outweighs the intrusion into the privacy
of the arrested person.2"
Typical fourth amendment analysis requires the balancing of two com-
peting interests.28 On the one hand, the government's interest in effective
law enforcement requires that government authorities have the power to con-
duct searches of the person.29 On the other hand, the individual has a right
of privacy and of bodily integrity.30 To accomodate both of these interests,
the fourth amendment requires that searches be "reasonable." 3' In Bell v.
Wolfish,32 the United States Supreme Court stated that the term
24. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of vehicle is permissible
to prevent evidence from being transported out of jurisdiction).
25. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of the arrestee and the area within
the arrestee's immediate control is permissible to protect the arresting officer and to prevent
the destruction of evidence). See W. LAFAVE, supra note 19, at § 5.2; infra notes 36-43 and
accompanying text.
26. A fundamental principle of fourth amendment analysis is that exceptions to the warrant
requirement are narrowly construed. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Mincey v. Ariona,
437 U.S. 385 (1978).
27. For example, when a police officer believes that an individual is concealing a weapon
and there are several bystanders in the area, the officer should have the right to search the
individual in order to protect other members of the public. See J.W. HALL, JR., supra note
3, at § 7:1.
28. The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing the
intrusion on the individual's privacy interests against the furtherance of legitimate governmental
interests. The purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect individuals' privacy interests by
imposing a standard of conduct on government officials carrying out their official duties. The
fourth amendment accomplishes this by requiring that searches be reasonable. See, e.g., Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (reasonableness of a search is judged by balancing the legitimate
governmental concern against its intrusion on an individual's privacy); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (test of reasonableness requires a balancing of the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails); see also J.W. HALL, JR., supra note 3, at §
1:10 (test of reasonableness is subject to abuse and courts should not sacrifice individual liber-
ties for the sake of effective law enforcement).
29. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (in order to carry out their duties, police
officers must have the right to protect themselves); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) (it is necessary for an arresting officer to protect himself while making an arrest).
30. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (fourth amendment creates a "right
to privacy, no less important that any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people").
31. See supra note 28.
32. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In Bell, the challenged strip searches occurred at a federal deten-
tion center in New York. The inmates, who were awaiting trial on serious federal charges,
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"reasonable," in the context of the fourth amendment, is "not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application." 33 Instead, the Court articulated
the factors to be balanced when determining reasonableness:
In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must
consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted."
The exigent circumstances and search incident to arrest exceptions to the
warrant requirement are deemed reasonable by the courts because, in most situa-
tions falling under these exceptions, the government's interest in conducting
the search outweighs the individual's right to privacy and bodily integrity.
The United States Supreme Court explained the justifications for the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement in Chimel v.
California.36 The Court stated that subsequent to an arrest, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person of the arrestee for
any weapons that may be used to resist arrest or to effect an escape. 7 Fur-
thermore, according to the Chimel Court, it is reasonable for the officer
to search for any evidence of crime on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.38
were strip searched after contact visits with persons from outside the facility. In an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the searches were reasonable intrusions and
did not violate the fourth amendment. The Court stated that a detention facility was a unique
place fraught with serious security dangers. The Court also stated that prison officials should
be given wide-ranging deference in carrying out their duties. Id. at 559. For a general discus-
sion of searches in prisons, see Note, Body Searches in Prisons, supra note 8.
33. 441 U.S. at 559.
34. Id. Similar language appeared in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), where
the Court stated that the reasonableness of a search is determined by balancing the govern-
ment's need to search against the individual's right to privacy, taking into account all the sur-
rounding circumstances.
35. In most cases under these exceptions, the search conducted does not intrude on a person's
dignity as severely as a strip search would. When a search is not highly intrusive, the govern-
ment's right to provide effective law enforcement will outweigh the individual's privacy rights.
If officers are not allowed to conduct a reasonable search incident to an arrest, the public
might suffer through inadequate law enforcemeni. To justify a strip search, however, the govern-
ment's need to search must be substantial in order to outweigh an individual's privacy rights.
See Note, Body Searches in Prisons, supra note 8, at 1046 (searches should be balanced on
a sliding scale; the more intrusive the search, the greater the government's need to search must be).
36. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The defendant in Chimel was suspected of burglarizing a coin
shop. Three police officers arrested him at his house and conducted a warrantless search of
his entire house at the time of arrest. Evidence obtained during that search was subsequently
introduced at his trial on burglary charges. The Court held that the search exceeded the per-
missible bounds of a search incident to an arrest and violated the defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights.
37. Id. at 763. This ruling is justified by the need to protect the police officer while carrying
out official duties. See supra notes 22 & 25.
38. 395 U.S. at 763.
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A warrantless search incident to an arrest, however, may be unreasonable
if the police officer exceeds the permissible scope of the search. The United
States Supreme Court has addressed the permissible scope of a search inci-
dent to an arrest on several occasions. In Chimel, the Court identified the
permissible scope as a search of the arrestee's person and the area within
his immediate control. The Court defined the area of immediate control as
the area from within which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence." In so holding, the Court quoted from Terry v.
Ohio'0 that "[tihe scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified
by' the circumstances which rendered it permissible.""' The Terry Court had
also stated that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate
the fourth amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. 2 Thus,
in both Terry and Chimel, the Court held that searches should be only as
intense as justified by the facts giving rise to it, and that any search more
intense than necessary would be unreasonable. This requires that the
reasonableness of a search be determined in each case by an examination
39. Id. Chimel limited the scope of the search incident to an arrest to the area within the
arrestee's immediate control. In construing that phrase, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
warrantless seizure of a gun, which was found in a paper bag approximately seven to ten feet
from the arrestee. The court stated that the factors to be considered when determining the
reasonableness of searching the area within the arrestee's immediate control are: the officer's
knowledge of whether or not the suspect is armed; the presence of another person who might
assist the arrestee in resisting arrest; and the officer's physical control over the situation. People
v. Williams, 57 111. 2d 239, 246, 311 N.E.2d 681, 685, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
See generally Aaronson & Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine
of Search Incident to Arrest, 64 GEo. L.J. 53 (1975) (the standard enunciated in Chimel is
an inadequate guide to lower courts).
Prior to Chimel, the United States Supreme Court had upheld searches of an arrestee's premises
incident to an arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (allowing the
search of an office and papers located within the office as incident to an arrest); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 867 (1947) (allowing the search of an arrestee's entire apartment inci-
dent to an arrest). Yet, the Chimel Court held that the search incident to arrest doctrine did
not encompass wholesale searches of the arrestee's premises. 395 U.S. at 762-63. Thus, Rabinowitz
and Harris were overruled. Id. at 768.
40. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry involved a stop and frisk or investigatory stop. In Terry, a
police officer stopped the defendant on the street because the officer believed that the defen-
dant was "casing" a store prior to robbing it. When the defendant mumbled a response to
the officer's question, the officer turned the defendant around and patted down the outside
of his clothes. The officer found a gun in the defendant's overcoat. The gun was introduced
into evidence despite the defendant's objection that it was the fruit of an illegal search.
The Court affirmed Terry's conviction, stating that the scope of a search must be limited
to that which is necessary for the discovery of the object for which the officer is searching.
Id. at 26.
41. 395 U.S. at 762 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19); see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (searches executed without a warrant must be tied strictly
to the circumstances which excuse the warrant).
42. 392 U.S. at 17-18. This is particularly applicable in the strip search cases. For example,
assume a person is arrested for a misdemeanor offense. The officer clearly has authority to
search that person. If a strip search is conducted, however, the officer's right to search is not
clear. If the officer has no reason to believe that either of the Chimel justifications for a search
[Vol. 33:575
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of the circumstances giving rise to the search."3
Four years later, however, the Supreme Court expanded the permissible
scope of the search incident to an arrest in United States v. Robinson."
The Court determined that a standardized rule governing the scope of a search
incident to an arrest would be more operable than "case-by-case
adjudication."' 5 The Court stated:
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a
search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the
fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and
we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under that Amendment."
Thus, pursuant to Robinson, an arrestee is always subject to a full search,
which may include "a relatively extensive exploration of the person.""
are present, then the search should be found to violate the fourth amendment. Thus, a search
may be reasonable at its inception, yet violate the fourth amendment by reason of its extreme
intensity and scope.
43. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
44. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In Robinson, the defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle
without a license. While conducting a pat-down search of the defendant, the arresting officer
felt an object in the defendant's pocket. Further examination revealed a crumpled up cigarette
package containing heroin. The defendant's conviction for possession of narcotics was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 218.
45. Id. at 235. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and stated that:
[the] more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its
suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not
there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the
person incident to a lawful arrest. We do not think the long line of authorities
of this Court . . . requires such a case-by-case adjudication. A police officer's deter-
mination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has
arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does
not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in
the search. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend
on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation
that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
Id. Thus, the Court abandoned case-by-case adjudication of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment and adopted a standardized rule to guide police behavior.
In his forceful dissent, Justice Marshall stated that the majority's approach represented a
"clear and marked departure from our long tradition of case-by-case adjudication of the
reasonableness of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment." Marshall also stated
that fourth amendment analysis required a "painstaking" case-by-case determination of
reasonableness in order to maintain the integrity of our individual rights. Id. at 238-39 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 235.
47. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968) (differentiating between the stop and frisk excep-
tion and the search incident to arrest exception).
1984]
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Three months after adopting a standardized rule governing search inci-
dent to arrest in Robinson, the Court decided United States v. Edwards."
In Edwards, the Court upheld the warrantless search and seizure of an
arrestee's clothing approximately ten hours after his arrest. 9 Prior to
Edwards, the Court had stated that a search incident to an arrest must be
conducted substantially contemporaneous with the arrest."0 By sustaining
the constitutionality of the search in Edwards, the Court expanded the time
frame in which a search incident to arrest is permissible. The Edwards deci-
sion indicated the Court's willingness to expand the search incident to arrest
doctrine.
Robinson and Edwards together indicated the movement of the Court
toward a more permissive view of the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement. The per se reasonableness of a strip search inci-
dent to an arrest, however, has remained subject to differing analyses by
the lower federal courts. Some courts have interpreted Bell v. Wolfish as
allowing a return to case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of strip
searches incident to arrest, notwithstanding Robinson. For example, in Tinetti
v. Wittke," the court held that the strip search of a woman arrested for
a traffic violation was unconstitutional. 3
In Tinetti, the plaintiff0 4 was arrested for speeding and, because she was
an out-of-state resident, was required to post a cash bond. Unable to post
the required bond, the plaintiff was taken to the police station, strip searched,
and detained until the bond could be posted. The strip search of the plain-
48. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
49. Id. at 808-09. At approximately 11:00 p.m., the defendant, Edwards, was arrested for
attempting to break into the Lebanon, Ohio Post Office. A police investigation revealed that
the attempted entry had been made by using a pry bar to force open a wooden window. The
use of the pry bar left paint chips on the window sill and around the window area. The next
morning, substitute clothes were purchased for the defendant and his clothes were seized as
evidence of the crime. Examination of this clothing revealed paint chips which matched those
that had been taken from the post office window. The clothing and the results of the examina-
tion were introduced at trial over the defendant's objection that they were illegally seized. Id.
at 801-02.
50. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (a search is incident to an arrest only if it
is conducted substantially comtemporaneous with the arrest); Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964) (a search too remote in time from the arrest cannot meet the fourth amend-
ment's test of reasonableness).
51. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In Bell, the Supreme Court determined that strip searches of detainees
in a federal custodial center after the detainees had visited with outsiders were reasonable.
The Court, in reaching this holding, stated that the test of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment is not capable of precise definition and requires consideration of the circumstances
surrounding each case. Id. at 559. It is worth noting that Bell is not a search incident to arrest
case.
52. 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 491.
54. The arrestee is referred to as plaintiff because subsequent to her arrest and strip search
she instituted this civil action against the sheriff's department alleging a violation of her con-
stitutional rights.
55. 479 F. Supp. at 488.
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tiff was conducted pursuant to a written policy of the Racine County,
Wisconsin Sheriff's Department, which provided that "all persons detained
in the County Jail, regardless of the offense, be subject to a strip search."1 6
The Tinetti court found that neither of the justifications for a search inci-
dent to arrest announced in Chimel were present. 7 First, the plaintiff was
not searched by the arresting officer at the time of arrest because there was
no reason to believe that she was carrying a dangerous weapon. Second,
the court stated that since traffic violations do not generally involve any
evidence which is likely to be destroyed, there was no reason to believe that
the plaintiff was concealing evidence.5 9 Therefore, since no justifiable basis
for the strip search existed, the Tinetti court concluded that the plaintiff's
fourth amendment rights had been violated.6"
Similarly, in Logan v. Shealy,6' the Fourth Circuit held that the strip search
of a woman arrested for a misdemeanor offense was unconstitutional. 6 In
Logan, a woman was arrested for driving while intoxicated, taken to the
police station, and strip searched.63 The Logan court stated that the nature
of the plaintiff's offense-driving while intoxicated-was not normally
associated with the possession of weapons or contraband." Furthermore,
the arrestee was present at the stationhouse for over one and one-half hours
and had not been searched at all before the strip search was conducted."
The court also stated that the strip search was unrelated to the security needs
of the facility and, when balanced against the intrusive nature of the strip
search, it could not be justified.66 Thus, the court found that the strip search
violated the arrestee's fourth amendment rights.67
In both Tinetti and Logan, the police conducted a strip search of a per-
son incident to an arrest. Although the Supreme Court in Robinson held
that a full search of the person requires no justification after an arrest, these
lower courts analyzed the respective cases pursuant to the Chimel decision.
In view of the intrusive nature of the searches for relatively minor offenses,
it is not difficult to understand why these courts have by-passed the Robinson
decision. Moreover, these lower courts may be aware of the publicity which
56. Id.
57. Id. at 490.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 491. Further, the court issued a permanent injunction barring similar strip searches
in the future. Id. at 490.
61. 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982).
62. Id. at 1013.
63. Id. The city's policy required that all persons detained, regardless of their offense,
be strip searched. Id. at 1010.
64. Id. at 1013.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court stated: "An indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied to all
detainees . .. cannot be constitutionally justified simply on the basis of administrative ease
in attending to security considerations." Id.
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the recent strip search cases have received. 8 Consequently, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Mary Beth G., which found the strip search policy of the
Chicago Police Department unconstitutional, must be viewed not only in
light of prior case law, but also in light of public sentiment. 9
Mary Beth G.
In the early part of 1979, a Chicago television station aired an investigative
report exposing the City of Chicago's policy of strip searching all female
detainees. Following this broadcast, the Illinois branch of the American Civil
Liberties Union filed Jane Does v. City of Chicago,'7 a class action suit
against the City which alleged that its blanket strip search policy was
unconstitutional. 7' The City's policy required that all female arrestees be strip
searched prior to detention in city lockups. The City's blanket strip search
policy did not require that the search be justified under the rationale of
Chimel.
In Jane Does, the three named plaintiffs had been arrested for traffic viola-
tions, taken to the police station, and strip searched.72 Granting plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, the district court found that the City's policy
was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. 73 The district court then
determined that the issue of damages should be decided in individual jury
68. In Chicago, a television station aired a three-part investigative report exposing the City's
strip search policy. See Simons, supra note 6, at 8.
69. In response to the public outrage over strip searches, the Illinois General Assembly
passed a statute governing strip searches. The statute provides that no person arrested for a
misdemeanor or traffic offense, except in cases dealing with weapons or a controlled substance,
shall be strip searched unless there is a reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a
weapon or contraband. The statute also provides that the officer conducting the search must
have written permission of the police commander. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §, 103-1 (1981);
see Singer, Strip and Body Cavity Searches in Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 86 (1980).
70. 580 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Il. 1983). The definition of the proposed class was:
all female persons who were detained by the CPD [Chicago Police Department]
for an offense no greater than a traffic violation or a misdemeanor, including all
females who were never charged with any offense and who were subjected to a
strip search in situations where there was no reason to believe that weapons or
contraband had been concealed on or in their bodies.
Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267 n.2.
71. The suit alleged that the challenged searches violated the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the state
equal protection clause. The Seventh Circuit held that the search policy violated each of these
constitutional protections. 723 F.2d at 1273-74. Only the fourth amendment issue will be addressed
in this Recent Case.
72. Id. at 1267 n.2. Mary Beth G. and Sharon N., were arrested after being stopped for
traffic violations because there were outstanding parking tickets registered to their cars. Hinda
Hoffman was arrested after being stopped for a traffic violation because she failed to produce
her driver's license. Id.
73. Id. at 1266. Prior to the district court's ruling, the parties entered into an agreement
which enjoined the City from continuing its strip search policy. The agreement provided that,
in settlement of plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, the City would be permanently enjoined
from conducting strip searches of any person arrested for misdemeanor or traffic offenses unless
the police believed that the arrestee was concealing contraband or weapons. The City, however,
did not admit to liability for the challenged searches. Id.
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trials rather than in a class action.14 Each plaintiff was awarded monetary
damages in a separate proceeding at the district court level." The City
appealed from these awards of monetary damages, as well as from the district
court's holding that the strip search policy was unconstitutional.
These cases were consolidated on appeal with another strip search case 7'
under the name of Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago." All of the strip search
cases litigated had been conducted in accordance with the City's established
procedures."8 On appeal, the City argued that its strip search policy did not
violate the fourth amendment, and that, even if it had, the damage awards
were excessive. The Seventh Circuit held that the City's policy of strip sear-
ching all female detainees was an unreasonable search under the fourth
amendment absent a "reasonable suspicion" on the part of police personnel
that the detainee was concealing a weapon or contraband.7 9 In reaching this
conclusion, the court first examined the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment."0 The court approv-
ingly noted the Chimel justifications for the search incident to arrest, and
then distinguished Robinson on the ground that it had not involved a strip
search.8 '
74. Id. The district court ordered the parties to select typical cases for trial on the issue
of damages.
. 75. Id. Mary Beth G. and Sharon N. were each awarded $25,000. Hinda Hoffman was
awarded $60,000.
76. In the case with which Mary Beth G. was consolidated, the plaintiff, Mary Ann Tikalsky,
was arrested for a misdemeanor offense (disorderly conduct), transported to the police station,
and strip searched. In a jury trial, the district court found that the City's policy violated Tikalsky's
fourth amendment rights and awarded her damages in the amount of $30,000. Id. at 1267.
77. Since the district court instructed the parties to select out typical cases for individual
trials on damages, the case took on the name of one of the plaintiffs to the class action.
78. The City's policy required each female placed in a detention facility to:
1) lift her blouse or sweater and to unhook and lift her brassiere to allow a
visual inspection of her breast area, to replace these articles of clothing and then
2) to pull up her skirt or dress or to lower her pants and pull down any
undergarments, to squat two or three times facing the detention aide and to
bend over at the waist to permit visual inspection of the vaginal and anal area.
The policy also required that the searches be conducted by a female officer in a closed room
away from the view of all other persons. Id.
This policy did not apply to males, who were strip searched only if the arresting officers
had reason to believe that the detainee was concealing a weapon or other contraband. Other-
wise, males were subject to a thorough hand search which the Mary Beth G. court described
as follows:
The male detainee would place his hands against the wall and stand normally while
the searching officer, with his fingers, would go through the hair, into the ears,
down the back, under the armpits, down both arms, down the legs, into the groin
area, and up the front. The officer would also search the waistband and require
the detainee to remove his shoes and sometimes his socks.
Id. at 1268.
79. 723 F.2d at 1273.
80. Id. at 1269-72; see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
81. 723 F.2d at 1269. The court stated that Robinson dealt with whether the officer could
search in order to disarm the suspect or to preserve evidence, and not the permissible intensity
of the search.
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Next, the court stated that it would employ the balancing test announced
in Bell v. Wolfish to evaluate the reasonableness of the searches conducted
in these cases, and described this balancing test as the "touchstone for fourth
amendment analysis." 8 The court reasoned that although the Supreme Court
had upheld strip searches in Bell, that decision was not controlling because
of "sufficiently significant" factual differences. 3 The court also stated that
Bell had not established a per se rule validating strip searches in the deten-
tion setting." Thus, the court concluded that it was compelled to conduct
its own inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the strip searches.8
Quoting from several sources, the Mary Beth G. court considered the
magnitude of the intrusion of strip searches on personal rights.' The court
concluded that the searches constituted a severe intrusion on a citizen's
privacy, and stated, "we can think of few exercises of authority by the state
that intrude on the citizen's privacy and dignity as severely as the visual
anal and genital searches practiced here."' 7 This intrusion on a person's
privacy was balanced against the City's need to maintain the security and
integrity of its detention facilities. After balancing these competing interests,
the court announced that "[wihile the need to assure jail security is a
legitimate and substantial concern, we believe that, on the facts here, the
strip searches bore an insubstantial relationship to security needs so that,
when balanced against [the arrestees'] privacy interests, the searches cannot
be considered 'reasonable."' Thus, the court held that the City's strip search
policy was unreasonable absent a "reasonable suspicion by the authorities"
that either of the Chimel justifications for a search incident to arrest was
present."
82. Id. at 1272; see supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
83. 723 F.2d at 1272. In Bell, the Supreme Court held that strip searches of pre-trial detainees
in a federal custodial center after visits with outsiders were reasonable. 441 U.S. at 560. The
Seventh Circuit found that Bell was not controlling because the detainees in that case were
awaiting trial on serious federal charges, while the detainees in Mary Beth G. were only minor
offenders. 723 F.2d at 1272.
84. 723 F.2d at 1272.
85. Id. But see Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1304 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1981)
(in-chambers opinion) (temporary stay pending hearing on certiorari petition), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 942 (1982). In the Clements in-chambers opinion, Justice Rehnquist, the author of the
Bell decision, stated that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Logan was completely at odds with
the Court's decision in Bell. He stated that the Fourth Circuit had incorrectly applied the Bell
test by not deferring to prison officials' judgment in security matters. Id. at 1309-10. The full
Court later denied certiorari.
86. 723 F.2d at 1272. The court quoted from the majority decision in Bell that visual
inspections "instinctively give us the most pause." 441 U.S. at 558. The court also quoted
from Marshall's dissenting opinion in Bell that "the body cavity searches ...represent one
of the most greivous offenses against personal dignity and common decency." Id. at 576-77
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. 723 F.2d at 1272.
88. Id. at 1273.
89. Id. The court did not define the circumstances that would give rise to a "reasonable
suspicion" that the arrestee was carrying a weapon or contraband.
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ANALYSIS
To determine the reasonableness of the strip searches that occurred in Mary
Beth G., the court employed the balancing test announced in Bell v.
Wolfish.9 ° The Bell Court's test of reasonableness correctly identified the
competing interests present in fourth amendment analysis: the government's
need for the search and the individual's right to privacy and bodily integrity.'
The test also considered the circumstances surrounding each search-including
the possible justification for the search as well as the scope of the particular
intrusion.92 This view, however, cannot be reconciled with the Supreme
Court's holding in Robinson.93 The Robinson Court held that once a lawful
arrest is established, a search incident to that arrest requires no additional
justification." ' If, as Mary Beth G., Tinetti, and Logan indicate, the test
of reasonableness under the fourth amendment now requires courts to look
at the circumstances surrounding each search, then these lower courts have
returned to case-by-case adjudication.
In Mary Beth G., the Seventh Circuit correctly applied the Bell balancing
test. First, the court determined the magnitude of the invasion on personal
rights that the strip searches entailed." The court then balanced the magnitude
of the invasion against the City's justification for the searches: the need
to maintain the security and integrity of its lockup.9" The court found that
the searches bore an insubstantial relationship to the City's security needs
90. 441 U.S. at 559. The Bell balancing test requires that the need for the particular search
be balanced against the intrusion on personal rights that the search entails. See supra notes
28-35 and accompanying text.
91. 441 U.S. at 559. In Deleware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court stated
that the purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect the individual from unwarranted govern-
ment intrusion. The Court further stated that in order to accomplish this, the fourth amend-
ment required that searches be reasonable. The reasonableness of a search is determined by
balancing the need for the search against the intrusion on personal rights that the search entails.
Id. at 654.
92. 441 U.S. at 559; see supra text accompanying note 34.
93. 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
94. 414 U.S. at 235. In so doing, the Robinson Court adopted a standardized rule govern-
ing the search incident to arrest doctrine. Robinson's standardized rule is a clear departure
from the Court's decision in Chimel. In Chimel, the Court stated that a search incident to
an arrest must be justified by the need to protect the officer and to prevent the destruction
of evidence. The Robinson decision removed the requirement that the officer justify his search
under Chimel and paved the way for abuse by police officers. See LaFave, supra note 16, at 162.
The Mary Beth G. court, however, correctly noted that the Robinson majority would have
been willing to find a search incident to arrest unconstitutional if the search was "extreme
or patently abusive." 723 F.2d at 1270 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236). Thus, the
standardized rule of Robinson does not legitimate all searches incident to arrest.
95. The court stated that the strip searches conducted here constituted a severe intrusion
on the arrestee's privacy and dignity. 723 F.2d at 1272.
96. Id. Certainly, the City has an interest in maintaining the security of its detention facilities.
In Bell, the Court stated that a detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security
dangers and that prison officials should be given wide-ranging deference in carrying out their
official duties. 441 U.S. at 559.
In Logan, the strip search policy was adopted by the county after a deputy sheriff allegedly
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so that, when balanced against the arrestee's privacy interests, the searches
could not be considered reasonable." Thus, the Seventh Circuit correctly
identified the competing interests and balanced them in accordance with the
Bell analysis."
The Mary Beth G. court examined the relationship between the challeng-
ed search and the City's need to search and found it insubstantial." In so
doing, the court suggested that the scope of a search should be tied strictly
to the facts that justify its initiation. ' In other words, the court is return-
ing to a Chimel-type analysis which would invalidate a search if it becomes
more intense than the facts giving rise to it justify.' 1
Furthermore, according to the court, the City of Chicago's policy of strip
searching women arrested for misdemeanor and traffic offenses cannot be
justified by either the need to protect the officer or the need to prevent
was shot by a misdemeanant who had not been thoroughly searched. 660 F.2d at 1010.
97. 723 F.2d at 1273.
98. As stated above, the competing interests in fourth amendment analysis are the govern-
ment's need to search in order to provide effective law enforcement and the citizen's right
to privacy and bodily integrity. The Bell test requires that these competing interests be balanced
against each other, taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the search. See
supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. This is precisely how the Mary Beth G. court deter-
mined the reasonableness of the challenged searches. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying
text. Thus, the court correctly followed the mandates of the Bell test.
99. 723 F.2d at 1272. The City introduced into evidence a study of searches made over
a 35 day period. The study showed that over 1800 females were processed and, of these arrestees,
seven percent were found to have concealed contraband and over three percent had items hid-
den on their bodies. Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-27, Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,
723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). Typical items found included gas guns, narcotics, knives, mat-
ches, cigarettes, hypodermic needles, and heroin kits. Id. These items were found in the
undergarments, vagina, or, in one case, the wig of an arrestee. Id.
The City argued that its security measures were necessary to "maintain jail security, to pre-
vent injury to guards and other inmates." Id. at 24. The City stated that excellent security
was necessary because "if an arrestee wields a weapon that had been well hidden, the police
would be deservedly criticized if someone is injured or if the arrestee escapes." Id. In some
respects, the City is in a "Catch-22" position. If the City conducts strip searches of all arrestees,
the result is, as Mary Beth G. indicated, condemnation of the City not only by the public,
but also by the courts. If the City does not conduct adequate searches of detainees, and some-
one is injured as a result, the City will also be condemned by the public. In either case,
the City would receive bad marks for its security procedures. See, e.g., People v. Seymour,
84 III. 2d 24, 38, 416 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (1981) (police would be subject to deserved criticism
if an arrestee produced a weapon and either injured someone or escaped).
100. The court stated that the facts upon which an intrusion is based must be capable of
measurement against an objective standard. The court also stated that the more intrusive the
search, the closer government authorities must come to showing that the search will uncover
the objects for which the search is being conducted. 723 F.2d at 1273. In other words, the
more intense the search, the greater the government's justification for the search must be in
order for the court to find it reasonable. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979) (facts upon which an intrusion is based must be capable of measurement); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (in a stop and frisk situation, officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which justify the warrantless intrusion).
101. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); see supra notes 36-43 and accompanying
text.
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the destruction of evidence-the traditional justifications for the search
incident to arrest announced by the Supreme Court in Chimel.'0 2 This is
demonstrated by the fact that, first, none of the arrestees in Mary Beth G.
were searched by the arresting officer at the time of arrest. Evidently, the
officers did not feel that these women posed any danger to their safety."0 3
Second, in a routine traffic arrest situation, there is no destructible evidence.
The only evidence of the offense is either the readout on the officer's speed
detection device or the officer's eyewitness account of the alleged violation.' 4
Because neither of the justifications for the search incident to arrest
announced in Chimel were present in Mary Beth G., the court correctly found
the searches to be unconstitutional.
The Mary Beth G. decision represents a clear departure from Robinson.
In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that a police officer does not have
to assess in each case the likelihood that the individual arrestee is possessing
a weapon or concealing evidence. According to the Court in Robinson, once
a lawful arrest is established, a search incident to that arrest requires no
additional justification."0 5 If the Mary Beth G. court had followed Robin-
son, it would not have examined the City's justification for the searches
and would have upheld the City's strip search policy. The court did, however,
analyze the possible justifications for the strip searches. In so doing, the
Seventh Circuit ignored Robinson and returned to a Chimel-type analysis,
which requires that the reasonableness of a search be determined in each
case. 106
102. In Chimel, the Court stated that the justification for the search incident to arrest was
the need to protect the officer and to prevent the destruction of evidence. 395 U.S. at 763;
see supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
103. 723 F.2d at 1271.
104. In Tinetti, the court stated that the discovery of evidence was not a sufficient justifica-
tion for the search because the individual had been arrested for speeding. The only evidence
was the readout on the arrestee's speedometer, as remembered by the arrestee, and the readout
on the officer's speed detection device. Thus, the arrestee "had no reason to conceal, and
the officer had no reason to suspect, the existence of any evidence" which could be discovered
by a strip search. 479 F. Supp. at 490.
In Logan, the court stated that the offense-driving while intoxicated-was not normally
associated with the possession of weapons or contraband. 660 F.2d at 1013; see Note, Con-
stitutional Law: Search and Seizure: An Analysis of Federal and Oklahoma Law in Light of
Recent Chicago Strip Search Cases, 34 OKLA. L. REv. 312 (1981) (author suggests that routine
traffic violations do not normally involve the use of a weapon, and traffic violations do not
produce evidence which may be concealed on the arrestee's person).
105. 414 U.S. at 235; see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
106. In Chimel, the Court stated that the recurring question of reasonableness in search and
seizure cases can only be determined by an examination of the facts and circumstances, or
the "total atmosphere" of the case. 395 U.S. at 765.
Had the Seventh Circuit followed Robinson, it would not have inquired into the reasonableness
of the particular searches because Robinson held that a search incident to a lawful arrest requires
no justification other than the arrest. 414 U.S. at 235. In Mary Beth G., the arrestees were
lawfully arrested and, according to Robinson, no additional justification for a search was
necessary. The Seventh Circuit, however, does require that authorities have a reasonable
suspicion-a justification other than the arrest itself-that weapons or contraband are present
prior to strip searching an arrestee. This is similar to the holding in Terry. In Terry, the Court
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In reaching its decision in Mary Beth G., the Seventh Circuit relied on
the Tinetti and Logan decisions. In Tinetti, the court held that the strip
search of a woman arrested for a traffic violation was unconstitutional under
the fourth amendment." 7 Similarly, in Logan, the Fourth Circuit held
unconstitutional the strip search of a woman arrested for a misdemeanor
offense.' 8 The Mary Beth G., Tinetti, and Logan decisions all held that
the scope and intensity of a search must be tied strictly to, and justified
by, the circumstances giving rise to it. This is precisely what the Chimel
analysis calls for. Thus, these cases represent a trend away from Robinson
and back to case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of a search inci-
dent to arrest. After these cases, the scope of a search is limited by the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.
While the decision in Mary Beth G. is commendable from a public policy
standpoint, it can be criticized for not extending the protection of arrestees
far enough. The Mary Beth G. decision protects only misdemeanor and other
non-felony arrestees from strip searches absent a reasonable suspicion that
the arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband. It does not protect felony
arrestees in any manner. If the reasonableness of a search is determined by
these traditional justifications of discovering weapons or contraband," 9 then
the fact that an individual is arrested for a felony is irrelevant. Under the
Chimel analysis, there would be no justification to strip search a felony
arrestee when the authorities have no reason to believe that the individual
is concealing a weapon or contraband.
The need to protect felony arrestees from unreasonable strip searches was
demonstrated in Dufrin v. Spreen. "" In Dufrin, the plaintiff " I was arrested
at her home pursuant to a warrant for a felonious assault allegedly commit-
ted two months earlier."' She was taken to the county detention center and
strip searched in accordance with the county's policy. ' 3 The search was held
stated that the officer is required to have reason "to conclude ... that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous." 392 U.S. at 30; see State v. Kaluna,
55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (court rejected Robinson and adopted a search incident
to arrest doctrine which requires that all searches be justified by a showing of probable cause
to search for the specific items, and that the intrusiveness of the search be limited to that
which is necessary to discover such items).
107. 479 F. Supp. at 491; see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
108. 660 F.2d at 1013; see supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
109. The justifications for the search incident to arrest were announced by the Supreme Court
in Chimel. The warrantless search incident to arrest is justified by the need to protect the
officer and to prevent the destruction of evidence. 395 U.S. at 763.
110. 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983); accord United States v. Klein, 552 F.2d 296 (1st Cir.
1975) (strip search of individual arrested on felony drug charges is constitutional).
11!. The arrestee is referred to as plaintiff because, subsequent to her arrest and strip search,
she instituted a civil action against the sheriff's department alleging a violation of her constitu-
tional rights.
112. 712 F.2d at 1085. The plaintiff was arrested for assaulting her 16 year old stepdaughter
with a broom handle.
113. The county's policy provided that "all female prisoners to be incarcerated in the Oakland
County Jail ...regardless of the nature of the charges against them and regardless of the
probability that they might be carrying contraband" shall be strip searched. Id.
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to be constitutional. 1 ' The Dufrin court distinguished Tinetti and Logan
on the ground that Dufrin involved a felony arrest rather than a misde-
meanor arrest,"' and further, found that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Bell v. Wolfish was controlling." ' According to the Dufrin court,
the case fell squarely within the area recognized by the Bell Court as requir-
ing wide-ranging deference to prison officials to allow them to carry out
their duties." 7
Neither of the Chimel justifications for a search incident to arrest were
present in Dufrin. First, there was no evidence that police personnel believed
that the arrestee was concealing a weapon. In any event a pat-down" 8 search
would have been sufficient to discover any weapon that she might have been
carrying. Second, the crime for which the plaintiff was arrested had allegedly
taken place two months earlier." 9 Hence, it is doubtful that the plaintiff
was concealing any evidence of that crime at the time of arrest. Although
Mary Beth G. did not involve a search incident to a felony arrest,' 20 Dufrin
illustrates that the requirements of Chimel will not be met in all felony ar-
rests. Notwithstanding the fact that the Dufrin court found the strip search
The search was conducted in the following manner:
1) the arrestee was led into a small room and directed to remove her clothing;
2) the clothing was placed in a bag;
3) the arrestee was viewed from both the front and the rear, and then required
to bend over;
4) the arrestee was then given a prison uniform;
5) the search was conducted by a female officer.
Id.
114. Id. at 1088-89.
115. Id. at 1089. The court stated: "It is not necessary for us to determine whether Tinetti
and Logan were correctly decided or should represent the law in this Circuit ...it is enough
to observe that their facts are clearly distinguishable from the undisputed facts before us."
Id. The crucial difference, according to the court, was that the plaintiff had been arrested
for a felony involving the use of violence, while in Tinetti and Logan, the offenses were a
traffic violation and a misdemeanor respectively. Id.
116. 1d. at 1088-89.
117. Id.; see supra note 32.
118. A pat-down search has been described as follows: "The officer must feel with sensitive
fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface
of the legs down to the feet." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968) (quoting Priar &
Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. ClUM. L. CRn.INOLOGY & POL. Sci. 481 (1954)).
119. 712 F.2d at 1085.
120. The arrest situations in Mary Beth G. involved persons arrested for traffic and mis-
demeanor offenses. 723 F.2d at 1267 n.2.
In a footnote, the Seventh Circuit distinguished United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296 (Ist
Cir. 1975), a case cited by the City involving the strip search of a felony arrestee. The court
stated that it had previously upheld such searches, Salinas v. Breier, 695 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.
1982) (strip search of felony arrestee suspected of concealing narcotics), but the searches con-
ducted in Mary Beth G. involved different circumstances. In Mary Beth G., the arrestees were
only misdemeanor and traffic offenders, and there was no reason to believe that any of them
were concealing contraband. Thus, the felony arrest cases where there was a reasonable belief
that the suspect was concealing contraband were not controlling. 723 F.2d at 1271 n.7.
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before it reasonable, the Seventh Circuit, when presented with a case in-
volving a search incident to a felony arrest, should continue the trend limiting
the permissible scope of the search incident to arrest established by Tinetti,
Logan, and Mary Beth G.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Mary Beth G. also fell short in its pro-
tection of arrestees by it's use of a "reasonable suspicion" standard. The
court held that the City's policy of strip searching all female arrestees was
unreasonable absent a "reasonable suspicion" by the authorities that the
individual was concealing contraband.' 2' The reasonable suspicion standard
that the court used is incapable of precise definition and is subject to vary-
ing interpretations. 22 Furthermore, the use of such a standard gives courts
and police officers little guidance in determining what factual circumstances
constitute a reasonable suspicion.' 3
IMPACT
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Mary Beth G. is part of a recent trend
limiting the scope of the search incident to arrest. The Mary Beth G. deci-
sion does not limit the authority to search, but instead limits the intensity
of a permissible search.' 2' This decision should prompt police departments
around the country to reassess and revise their search incident to arrest
policies. 2 ' Efforts should be made to make police officers more aware of
121. 723 F.2d at 1273.
122. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court stated "in justifying the par-
ticular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."
Id. at 21. This language has been quoted as the test of reasonable suspicion. United States
v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1524 (1lth Cir. 1983); United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 628
(9th Cir. 1979).
In Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1977), the court stated that the term "reasonable
suspicion" is not capable of definition. Id. at 139 n.2 (quoting police guidelines). Further,
"it is more than a hunch or mere speculation . . . but less than the probable cause necessary
for an arrest." Id. In United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1979), the court stated
that California law permits investigatory stops on a showing of "rational suspicion." This means
"some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place" and that the person under scrutiny
is somehow connected with the activity. Id. at 628. In a footnote the court stated that "there.
is no substantial difference" between the "reasonable" and "rational" suspicion standards.
Id. at 628 n.3.
123. The Seventh Circuit did not outline any factual circumstances that would constitute
a reasonable suspicion. The reasonable suspicion tests that have been articualted by the courts
are not a reliable guide for police officers. If the courts have been unable to set a precise
standard for reasonable suspicion, it is evident that a police officer in the field would also
have a difficult time determining what facts establish a reasonable suspicion.
124. The holding in Mary Beth G. does not prevent police officers from searching a traffic
or misdemeanor arrestee incident to an arrest. Rather, Mary Beth G. requires that police per-
sonnel have a reasonable suspicion that a traffic or misdemeanor arrestee is concealing contra-
band before a strip search can be conducted. 723 F.2d at 1273. Thus, Mary Beth G. limits
the permissible scope and intensity of an otherwise reasonable search incident to an arrest.
See Shuldiner, supra note 8, at 280-82.
125. If the police departments do not act themselves, the state legislature may do so. In
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the reasoning supporting the search incident to arrest doctrine. Furthermore,
revised policies should include a strict prohibition against strip searching
arrestees when police personnel do not suspect the arrestee of concealing
contraband. Permissible strip searches should be an exception to a general
rule which prohibits such highly offensive intrusions. Revisions of police
department practices would be a major step in protecting individuals' jealously
guarded fourth amendment rights.' 2
The result in Mary Beth G. is also likely to prompt other women who
have been strip searched to file civil actions against the offending agency. '27
Prior to Mary Beth G., many women who were strip searched remained
silent in order to avoid the publicity that would accompany filing a civil
suit.'"' Now, however, attitudes toward women's rights in general have
changed, and more women are willing to speak out against strip search
practices.' In addition, the prospect of a monetary damage award may also
induce other women to file suit.
Whether Mary Beth G. will have an effect on decisions outside the strip
search area is difficult to determine. Much depends on the precise makeup
of the Supreme Court. When determining the proper balance between the
competing interests,' 30 some Justices favor the government's interest in
effective law enforcement while others favor the privacy rights of individuals.
Mary Beth G., however, does provide a framework by which courts may
limit all types of searches incident to arrest.' 3' By limiting the scope of the
search incident to arrest to situations where a search is justified under Chimel,
the Seventh Circuit has at least reminded other courts of the principles
underlying the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
Illinois, for example, thelegislature passed a statute governing the permissibility of strip searches.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-1 (1983); see supra note 67.
This statute was passed shortly after the Jane Does class action was filed. See Simons, supra
note 6, at 56-57.
126. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (exceptions to the warrant requirement
are jealously and carefully drawn); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) ("excep-
tions to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant have been jealously and carefully
drawn").
127. One commentator suggests that a "barrage" of civil suits will be filed now that strip
search practices have come to light. See Simons, supra note 6, at 8. Furthermore, the extensive
publicity surrounding the strip search cases is likely to apprise other strip search victims of
their right to bring suit.
128. A co-administrator of the ACLU in Houston states that many women complained of
being strip searched several years ago. None of these women, however, would file a civil suit
because of the publicity such a suit would receive. Id. at 56.
129. The City of Chicago's strip search policy has been in place since 1952. 723 F.2d at
1268. Yet, only recently have cases been filed against the City. The most plausible explanation
for this is that women are now fighting for their legal rights in all areas. Further, the public
is more open to women's problems and more responsive to the complaints of females. Simons,
supra note 6, at 56.
130. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
131. In Mary Beth G., the Seventh Circuit held that the strip search of a misdemeanor arrestee
could only be conducted when the authorities have a reasonable suspicion that a weapon or
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CONCLUSION
The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment allows a police officer to make a warrantless search of
the arrestee incident to a lawful arrest. In Chimel v. California, the Supreme
Court articulated the justification for and the scope of a permissible search
incident to arrest. The Chimel Court stated that the scope of the search
incident to an arrest should be tied strictly to the circumstances which justify
it, and that any search beyond that would be invalid. Since the Chimel deci-
sion, the permissible scope of the search incident to arrest has been expanded,
allowing police to routinely strip search female arrestees without any justifica-
tion. Mary Beth G. is one of several recent decisions which has condemned
such practices by finding them unconstitutional.
From the public's standpoint, the Mary Beth G. decision is both com-
mendable and overdue. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit was unable to
extend the fourth amendment protection it afforded misdemeanor arrestees
to felony arrestees. Hopefully, when a search incident to a felony arrest is
presented to the Seventh Circuit, the court will continue the trend it has
helped create and protect felony arrestees from strip searches. By so doing,
the court would limit the scope of the search incident to arrest sufficiently
to adequately protect all arrestees under the fourth amendment.
Jonathan A Koff
other contraband is being concealed. 723 F.2d at 1273. This rationale could be used to limit
the scope and intensity of all types of searches incident to arrest. The most apparent example
is a search of an automobile incident to an arrest. Courts could limit the scope of such searches
by applying a Chimel analysis. If neither the need to prevent the destruction of evidence nor
the need to protect the officer is present, a search incident to an arrest should not include
a search of the arrestee's vehicle.
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